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STRATEGIC RESTRAINT IN CONTESTS
Abstract
Economic policy is modeled as the outcome of a (political) game between
two interest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game
correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature the policies fought for
are exogenous. We extend such games by allowing the endogenous
determination of the proposed policies. In a first stage the groups decide
which policy to lobby for and then, in a second stage, engage in a contest
over the proposed policies. Our main result is that competition over
endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces
polarization and, in turn, wasteful lobbying activities.
Keywords: Interest groups, endogenous lobbying targets, voluntary
restraint, polarization, voluntary restraint












Economic policy is often the outcome of a (political) game-contest between interest
groups. Under the status-quo some policy is implemented. The contest between the
interest groups on the approval of their preferred policies involves a struggle between
one group that defends the status-quo and other groups that challenge it by fighting
for alternative policies. For example, a tax reform may involve a struggle between
different industries. Existing pollution standards may be defended by the industry and
challenged by an environmentalist interest group. A monopoly can face the opposition
of a customers coalition fighting for appropriate regulation. Capital owners and a
workers union can be engaged in a contest that determines the minimum wage, and so
on. The outcome of the contest depends on the stakes of the contestants and, in turn,
on their exerted  (fighting, lobbying, rent-seeking) efforts. The realized, ex-post,
payoff configuration of the interest groups depends on the policy proposal that
actually emerges as the winner of the contest.
In the literature, special cases of the above setting are studied. See, for example,
Baik (1998), Ellingsen (1991) and Schmidt (1992) who analyzed the welfare effect of
consumer opposition to the existence of monopoly rents. In these studies the policies
fought for are exogenous. Furthermore, the status-quo policy and the policy proposed
by a single challenger are assumed to coincide with the contestants’ optimal policies
under certainty conditions where there is no opposition. Although these scholars have
recognized that interest groups’ awareness to the existence of an opposition may
affect their efforts, they disregarded the possible effects of such awareness on their
proposed policies. An interest group may prefer a proposal that reduces its (certain)
benefit in case of winning the contest, if it anticipates a sufficient increase in the
winning probability of that more moderate proposal, thus increasing its expected
payoff. In particular, the challenger of the status-quo may be induced to propose a
policy which is closer to the status-quo policy and the defender of that policy may
prefer to propose a new policy that to some extent compromises with the optimal
strategy of the challenger.
The main purpose of this study is to extend the analysis of economic policy
determination by allowing the endogenous formation of the proposed policies – the
lobbying targets.  In our proposed general setting, in a first stage interest groups2
decide which policy to lobby for and, then, in a second stage, engage in a contest over
the proposed policies. Using as a benchmark a status-quo policy  which is  the
preferred policy of one interest group (the status-quo defender) when there is no
opposition, we establish that the status-quo is not an equilibrium strategy of “the
defender”. Likewise, the equilibrium proposal of “the challenger” differs from his
optimal proposal when he does not face any opposition. Both interest groups choose
more moderate positions. Hence, competition over endogenously determined policies
reduces polarization and, in turn, wasteful lobbying activities. Such competition
cannot result, however, in a (strategic) compromise where the two interest groups
share the same equilibrium proposal and so entirely avoid the expenditure of wasteful
resources. The extended competition over the endogenously determined proposals can
therefore still be inefficient relative to a real compromise.
Our attempt to endogenize the proposed policies and therefore the contestants’
payoffs is related to the literature on optimal contest design. In contrast to that
literature, however, where a contest designer  (a bureaucrat or an elected politician)  is
assumed to control the contestants’ rents,  Appelbaum and Katz (1987), Kohli and
Singh (1999), in our model the contestants themselves determine their rents. Chung
(1996) and Gradstein (1993) also analyze the endogenous determination of rents.
Their setting is different and somewhat restrictive, first because the payoffs of the
contestants are symmetric and, second because the variability of the contested prize is
only reached via its dependence on the aggregate efforts of the contestants. See also
Ursprung (1990) and Sun and Ng (1999). Finally, our result is also related to the
studies of Cairns and Long (1991) and Glazer and McMillan (1992) on voluntary
price regulation. Using different settings inspired by Becker’s (1983) pressure model,
these authors show that, within a monopoly context, the threat of price regulation due
to an effective political opposition by consumers may induce the monopolist to price
below the unregulated price.
In the next section we present the extended two-stage game, establish the main
result and illustrate it numerically.  In section III the main result is re-established in
the context of a more general one-stage game. One special case of this game can be
conceived as a reduced  form of the two-stage game. Section IV contains a brief
summary and concluding remarks on the  implications of our result.3
II. The Basic Setting
Suppose that a status-quo policy is challenged by one interest group and defended by
another group. This policy can be the price of a regulated  monopoly, the maximal
degree of pollution the government allows or the existing tax structure. The defender
of the status-quo policy (hence-for interest group d) prefers the status-quo policy Is to
any alternative policy. The challenger of the status-quo policy (interest group  c)
prefers the alternative policy Ia. Without any loss of generality, it is assumed that Is £
Ia and that the policy  Is  (Ia) is the optimal policy proposal of the defender (the
challenger), provided that his supported policy gains certain approval. That is,
disregarding the possibility that his proposed policy can be rejected, in which case the
policy proposed by the rival interest group is assumed to be approved.  For example,
in the contest over monopoly regulation studied in Baik (1998), Ellingsen (1991) and
Schmidt (1992), the monopoly firm defends the status-quo, lobbying for the profit-
maximizing monopoly price (against any price regulation), while the consumers
challenge the status-quo lobbying for the competitive price (a tight price cap).
The actual implemented policy depends on the contest between the interest
groups on the approval of their proposed policies. These proposed policies that are
endogenously determined in our extended setting are denoted Ic and Id. The outcome
of the political contest is given in terms of the probabilities Prc and  Prd that the
interest groups c and d win the contest.  The outcome of the contest depends on the
stakes of the contestants and, in turn, on their proposed policies and on their exerted
lobbying or rent-seeking efforts. In the current study the government is not introduced
as a player in the policy-determination game. However, the important role of the
political environment (the form of the government, its motivation and the decision
rule it applies) is represented by the commonly used contest success function that
specifies the relationship between the outcome of the contest and the proposed
policies or the efforts of the interest groups.
We first present the two-stage game where the players first decide which
policy to lobby for and then engage in the struggle over the approval of their proposed
policies. In this illustrative game we assume a special contest success function. Our
results are valid however for a general class of such functions and, in fact, they are
valid in a more general class of games as we argue in the next section.4
A.  The two-stage game
The interest groups make two types of decisions. In the first stage of the game they
non-cooperatively select their proposed policies, the lobbying targets, Ic and Id.  In the
second stage they engage in a contest over the approval of the proposed policies. The
interest groups are assumed to pre-commit on the policies proposed in the first stage.
 1
The means of the interest groups to affect the outcome of the contest, viz. their
winning probabilities, in the second stage of the game is their lobbying or rent-
seeking efforts  xc and  xd . Given the policy proposals  Ic and  Id  and the utility
functions Uc and Ud, the stakes of the interest groups are
(1)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) c d d d d c d d c c c d c c I U I U I I N and I U I U I I N - = - = , ,
The utility functions Uc and Ud are assumed to be monotonic, continuous and twice
differentiable and recall that they are maximized, respectively, at the policies Ia and Is,
Is £ Ia.  Notice that when Ic = Id both stakes are equal to zero and that ¶ Nc /¶ Id <  0
and ¶ Nd / ¶ Ic  >  0.
The expected net payoff (surplus) of the risk neutral challenger and defender
are, respectively, given by 
2
(2) ( ) ( ) ( ) c d c c c d c c x I I N I U u E - + = , Pr
and
(3) ( ) ( ) ( ) d d c d d c d d x I I N I U u E - + = , Pr
For any given pair of policy proposals we assume that the probabilities
c d and Pr Pr  are determined by  Tullock’s (1980) commonly used contest success
function. That is,
                                                                
1 For different rent-seeking games with an explicit time structure that allow for such commitment, see
Baik and Kim(1997) ,Baik and Shogren (1992) , Baye and Shin (1999), Dixit (1987) and Leininger
(1993).
2 Notice that:  ( ) ( ) ( ) j j j j i j i j x I U I U u E - + = Pr Pr ,  Thus
    ( ) ( ) ( ) d c j i and j i for x I I N I U u E j i j j j i j j , , , Pr = „ - + = .5
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  In our two-stage game with full information a sub-game perfect equilibrium
can be calculated by using the following backward induction procedure. The
equilibrium effort levels determined at the second stage are interior (xc and xd are
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The equilibrium expected net payoff (surplus) of the challenger and the defender
are, respectively, given by
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3 The sufficient second order conditions of such equilibria are assumed to be satisfied.6
Anticipating these equilibrium net payoffs, the interior equilibrium policy proposals
of the two interest groups are characterized by

















 Notice that since Ia maximizes Uc, it also maximizes Nc(Ic,Id), for any given Id that
differs from  Ia. Similarly, Is maximizes Nd(Ic,Id), for any given Ic that differs from Is.
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The above inequalities directly imply that, as long as the two interest groups engage
in a viable contest in the second stage of the game, in equilibrium the two interest
groups are induced to voluntarily moderate their proposals relative to their best







c < Ia and  I
*
d > Is. That is
Proposition 1: Competition over endogenously determined policy proposals reduces
polarization.
The intuition for this result is as follows: If there is no opposition the challenger
chooses the policy  Ia. In the presence of an opposition, the challenger realizes that
lowering his proposal below Ia leads to a decrease of his payoff from winning the
contest. But the more restrained proposal yields an increase in the payoff of the7
opponent and, in turn, a reduction in his stake  that induces him to become less
aggressive. The resulting decline in the defender’s probability of winning the contest
clearly benefits the challenger. Since the latter favourable effect dominates the former
unfavourable effect, the challenger prefers to restrain his lobbying target, i.e., propose
a policy below  Ia. A similar intuition explains the readiness of the defender of the
status-quo to moderate his position by proposing a policy that exceeds Is.
Baik (1999), Ellingsen (1991) and Schmidt (1992) study the welfare effect of
consumer opposition to the existence of monopoly rents sharing the assumption that
the contested alternatives are the standard textbook profit-maximizing price and the
competitive consumer-surplus-maximizing price. Proposition 1 implies that, as long
as the alternative prices are endogenously selected by the monopoly firm and by its
customer coalition, the firm would voluntarily support some price regulation and the
consumers would not lobby for a tight price cap.
4 Our result has a broad applicability
as the framework we are suggesting naturally fits numerous contexts where economic
policy is the outcome of interest group pressures that may take the form of lobbying,
rent-seeking, bribes or campaign contributions.
Although polarization is reduced, it is not eliminated. That is, an equilibrium
with completely converging proposed policies is impossible. To prove this claim,
suppose, to the contrary, that (I
*, I
*) is such an equilibrium. Then, by the definition of
Nash equilibrium, for every Ic, Uc(I
*) exceeds E(Uc( Ic, I
*)) .  Recall that E(Uc(Ic, I
*))
= Uc(I
*) +  (Prc(Ic, I
*) Nc(Ic, I
*) - x*(Ic, I
*)) = Uc(I
*) + A (Ic, I
*).  Since  A(Ic, I
*)  is
positive  when  Ic is associated with  a positive stake and  I
* differs from such  Ic,
E(Uc(Ic, I
*)) exceeds Uc(I
*). The obtained contradiction implies that (I
*, I
*) cannot be
an equilibrium, which proves our claim. Namely,
Proposition 2 : The equilibrium policy proposals of the interest groups cannot
coincide.
                                                                
4 For related results in the special context of monopoly regulation, see Cairns and Long (1991) and
Glazer and McMillan (1992).  Using the different setting of Becker’s (1983) pressure model, these
authors show that the monopolist is induced to price below the unregulated profit-maximizing price.
The former authors argue that the monopolist takes into account the effect of his price on the
probability that regulation is imposed by the legislator. Self regulation is his way to permit government
regulation. The latter authors argue that lack of knowledge by the monopolist of just how much can be
extracted from consumers before they will be induced to mount an effective political opposition
induces him to accept a lower price.8
The intuition behind this result is as follows: for both interest groups, a deviation from
any agreed upon compromise results in a first order increase in the expected payoff,
Pri(Ii,  I
*) N i(Ii,  Ij), and a second order reduction in the expected payoff, - xi.
Consequently, both interest groups are induced to deviate from any agreed upon
proposal and conflict is a necessary outcome of the interaction in our game.
5 Since
there always remain effective incentives for the interest groups to engage in a viable
contest, wasteful resources are expended in the second stage of the game. Note that
the interest groups could, of course, increase their expected payoffs by agreeing to cut
down their lobbying efforts by the same proportion. This implies that the equilibrium
of the policy – determination game is inefficient. The example in the next section
illustrates the possibility that both interest groups can become better off if they share
the same proposal.
B.  A numerical example
Let  ( ) ( ) I I I Uc - = 1  and   ( ) ( ) I I I Ud 10 1- = .  By (1),
( ) ( ) ( ) d d c c d c c I I I I I I N - - - = 1 1 ,  and   ( ) ( ) ( ) c c d d d c d I I I I I I N 10 1 10 1 , - - - =
It can be readily verified that the optimal policies of the challenger and the defender
are equal, respectively, to Ia = 0.5 and Is = 0.05. The solution of (10) and (11) yields
the non-converging equilibrium policies  I
*
c = 1/6 and I
*
d = 1/12. The challenger
voluntarily reduces his proposal from 1/2 to 1/6 and the defender of the status-quo
moderates his position and increases the proposal from 0.05 to 1/12. The reduced
polarization is reflected by a reduction in the contestants’ stakes r elative to the
benchmark case:  the challenger’s stake is reduced from  Nc(0.5, 0.05) = 0.2025 to
Nc(1/6, 1/12) = 0.0625 and the defender’s stake is reduced from Nd(0.5, 0.05) = 2.025








d) = Ud(1/6) + 0.055 = (1/6)(-4/6) + 0.055 = - 0.056
                                                                
5 A different result can be obtained if the interest groups are allowed to be risk averse or in a different
one-time interaction setting, see Skaperdas (1992).9
Notice that, since E(U
*
c) >  Uc(1/12)  and  E(U
*
d) >  Ud (1/6) , the challenger and the
defender  prefer to moderate their positions , but still engage in the equilibrium
contest and not  share their opponent’s proposal.
The interest groups are induced to voluntarily restrain their proposals,
nevertheless, they still have an effective incentive to engage in a wasteful contest. The
equilibrium outcome can therefore be inefficient. Indeed this is the case in the
example as there exist pairs of policy proposals (Ic, Id) that yield increased expected –
payoffs to both interest groups. In particular, there are (Ic, Id) = (I, I) that satisfy the
following inequalities:
  Uc (I) = I ( 1 – I ) >  0.083  and  Ud (I) = I (1 – 10I)  >  -0.056.
The solution of this system of inequalities is given by I that satisfy 0.091 < I < 0.13.
Agreement on such proposals could have made both interest groups better off. Such
an agreement is efficient. However, it is not an equilibrium outcome.
III. The One-Stage Game: A Generalization
The analysis of endogenous policy proposals can be carried out using a one-stage
game where the outcome of the contest is determined by the policy proposals of the
interest groups. Despite its simpler form, this game may fit more general settings as it
does not require that interest groups are able to affect the approval probability of the
proposed policies through investment in lobbying or rent-seeking activities.
Nevertheless, the one stage framework captures that possibility because it can be
conceived as a reduced form of the two-stage game of the previous section as well as
of other two-stage games. The advantage of this simpler reduced form is that we no
longer need to make particular assumptions regarding the behaviour of the interest
groups in terms of their lobbying efforts or regarding the particular form of the contest
success function. The latter function can be of Tullock’s form or of alternative forms,
e.g., the frequently used logit or probit forms. We present below the more general
setting and then clarify how is it related to the two-stage game studied so far.
Suppose that the approval probability of the policy proposed by the challenger
(the defender) is Prc (Prc=1- Prd). This probability  ( ) d c c I I , Pr now directly depends
on the two proposals:  Ic and I d.  It is assumed that, for any given policy of the10
defender, Id, I d  < Ia, ,as the challenger’s becomes more extreme and raises  Ia, the
approval  probability of his proposal declines. On the other hand, as the defender
moderates his position and raises  Id,, the approval probability of his proposal
increases. That is,
















The assumption implies that the political process that generates the approval
probabilities always rewards unilateral restraint by both interest groups. Put
differently, the chances of an interest group to see its supported position implemented
become higher if that position is moderated. This basic characteristics of the political
environment is the main driving force of our result. 
6
Denote by  ( ) ( ) d c d d c c I I n and I I n , ,  the stakes of the challenger and the
defender of the status-quo.   Notice that under the one stage setting these stakes can be
different from the stakes presented in the previous section
( ( ) ( ) ds c d d c c I I N and I I N , , ).
The expected payoff (surplus) of the challenger and the defender are,
respectively, given by:
(15) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) d c c d c c d c c I I I I n I U u E , Pr , + =
and
(16) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) d c d d c d c d d I I I I n I U u E , Pr , + =
In this simpler one-stage setting the ability of the interest groups to affect the
probabilistic outcome of the political game by investing in lobbying activities is not
ruled out, however, it is not introduced explicitly. If, for example,
( ) ( )
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=  (i, j =
a, d),  then the problem described in the two-stage game setting is equivalent to the
one-stage game; The equilibrium policy proposals in the two games are identical as11
the strategy sets and the expected payoffs of the players are the same ((8) and (9) are
identical to (15) and (16)). The stakes in the one-stage game can now be interpreted as
the reduced stakes of the two-stage game.  In other words, the stakes in the one-stage
game already take into account, although only implicitly, the Nash equilibrium
expenditures of the interest groups that do try by lobbying, rent seeking, campaign
contributions etc.  to affect the probability of approval of their proposed policies.
  In the one stage game the stakes satisfy the following conditions:
















Notice that if the interest groups cannot affect their winning probabilities by lobbying
efforts, then we can let  ( ) ) , ( , j i i j i i I I N I I n =  ( i, j = c, d). In such a case,















. If, however, the one stage-game is
conceived as a reduced form of a more complex two-stage game that allows for
influence activities, as in Becker (1983), then (17) may hold with equalities or
inequalities. Adding more costs (for example, costs due to increased political
uncertainty, as in Glazer and McMillan (1992)), can only moderate the optimal policy
proposals of the interest groups. Since adding influence costs can never increase the
optimal policy proposals beyond the ones obtained under certainty conditions, the
sign of the derivatives in (17) cannot be reversed.  In a reduced-form game then Ia and
Is need not maximize the reduced stakes. Whether they maximize these stakes
depends on whether the reduced form takes into account the possible relationship
between lobbying efforts of the interest groups and the approval probabilities of their
proposals.  Once again we obtain that,
(18) ( ) 0 <
¶
¶




   and     ( ) 0 >
¶
¶




                                                                                                                                                                                         
6. A similar assumption is made in Glazer and McMillan (1992) in the context of a monopoly that takes
into account the probability that regulation is imposed.12
and consequently we get  that  a c I I <
*  and  s d I I >
* . Hence, competition between
interest groups induces restraint, i.e., decreases the polarization between the proposed
polices, both in the two-stage game of the previous section and in the one-stage game
which is amenable to broader interpretations.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Competition over endogenously determined policy proposals reduces the polarization
between the positions of interest groups. In particular, each group restrains its
proposal relative to its optimal proposal under certainty. This result is valid in the
illustrative stylized two-stage game and in the more general one-stage game.
Although the interest groups voluntarily restrain their proposals, they are nevertheless
induced to engage in a wasteful contest as complete agreement is not an equilibrium
outcome.
Our result has broad applications. It rationalizes the self-restraint of interest
groups such as firms investing in pollution control or voluntarily adopting cleaner
production processes or such as environmentalists who do not maintain a zero
pollution target. It explains why monopolists are induced to self regulate their price
and why their customer coalitions do not insist on a tight price cap. It also implies that
an interest group’s support of a welfare program or of any policy that has
redistribution effects need not reflect its altruistic preferences, but rather its egoistic
strategic restraint
The robustness of our result needs to be examined with respect to an increase in
the number of interest groups that propose policy proposals.. Another possible
worthwhile extension is the endogenization of the contest success function by adding
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